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The language of theoretical physics im-
plies a hierarchy. We celebrate ‘unified’
models that encompass previously dis-
joint entities. The stated goal of many
theoretical physicists is a ‘Theory of Ev-
erything’, which is taken to mean a uni-
fied theory of gravity and the standard
model of particle physics. Yet should
not a theory of ‘everything’ contain lit-
erature, penguins, and the Holy Roman
Empire? Implicit within this terminol-
ogy is the assumption that with such a
theory this should be possible - it’s sim-
ply a matter of following the mathemat-
ics until we derive these phenomena.
There are insurmountable practical
issues as to why it can never be the case
that social science or Brexit is derived
from fundamental physics. We cannot
even model complex molecules directly
from the standard model. There is no
way to derive DNA, human organs, and
all the complex structure that lies be-
tween the standard model and the be-
haviour of a society from their physical
foundations. As Kohn points out in his
Nobel prize acceptance lecture (1998),
to solve a system of just 100 electrons
would require minimizing a function
across 10150 dimensions. Thus “tra-
ditional wavefunction methods ... are
generally limited to molecules with a
small total number of chemically active
electrons”. The size of our observable
universe is approximately 10184 Planck
volumes, so even an ideal computer ca-
pable of storing detailed for each of
these dimensions at the quantum grav-
ity scale could not sufficiently explore
the space required to completely model
a glucose molecule to a good level of
accuracy at the subtomic level, as this
would require over 33×192 ' 10274 min-
imizations for the electrons and protons
alone. As photosynthesis is explained in
chemical formulae in terms of glucose
that are understood and tested by high
school students the world over, why
should we claim that that explanation is
less fundamental than that prescribed in
such a way that it can never be calcu-
lated? Occam’s razor cuts deeply into
such explanations. In practice. we take
the available data and construct a map to
compress the information into a useful
form that actually works. If the map is
bigger than the object it represents, then
there is no need of the map.
The solution to this problem is that
we make approximations, simplifica-
tions, and effective laws. Effective field
theory is put into place to explain phe-
nomena that cannot be derived from a
more fundamental level, and is often the
tool used to make predictions that are
confirmed by observations. As Rov-
elli notes “There is no physics with-
out approximations”. Follow the chain
of emergence from quarks to atoms to
molecules to cells to neurons to lobes
to brains to people to a social groups.
At each stage we do not derive the be-
haviour directly, but study the system
in terms of new variables appropriate
to that level. We model and test the
larger system to ensure that our approx-
imations hold. So the science of the
larger system is established through em-
pirical observation independently of its
constituent parts. It isn’t any less scien-
tifically valid to talk of the behaviour of
atoms instead of quarks, or people in-
stead of neurons. To insist that we do
so is to ignore the primality of observa-
tion: the model in question is tested and
found to work, therefore it is a valid sci-
entific description of reality.
To insist that any scientific model
must descend from fundamental physics
neglects the issue of the utility of the
model. No engineer building a bridge
ever lost sleep over the inability of the-
orists to reconcile quantum mechan-
ics and general relativity. Nor should
they. Science is the modelling of real-
ity. When a model is tested and found
to work in some regime, it is anchored
in reality. It is immaterial that we
cannot derive this model from some-
thing more ‘fundamental’ as its scien-
tific truth is borne out by its utility.
If we insist that only the most ‘funda-
mental’ model is true, then science be-
comes a house of cards. As we do
not have a confirmed candidate for this
most fundamental model, the situation
would be dire; we have neither deter-
mined nor tested the foundations on
which we would construct our hierar-
chy. Also any error in any of the lay-
ers between the fundamental and the
model in question brings the whole sys-
tem down. This, fortunately, is not how
science is done. A revolutionary ob-
servation that confirmed string theory
would be immaterial to the condensed
matter physicist. Their observations and
models would remain unchanged, and
the practical challenge to the fundamen-
tal model would be to reproduce the
known observations at the higher level.
The burden of finding agreement lies
not with the established macro level the-
ory, but with the microscopic hypothe-
sis. What is most fundamental is that a
model match with testable reality, and
that applies at each level. As Philip
Anderson has written, “The principle of
emergence is as pervasive a philosophi-
cal foundation of the viewpoint of mod-
ern science as is reductionism. It un-
derlies, for example, all of biology, as
emphasized especially by Ernst Mayr,
and much of geology. It represents an
open frontier for the physicist, a frontier
which has no practical barriers in terms
of expense or feasibility, merely intel-
lectual ones.”
